Latest intelligence — Q+A + webinar (29 May 2026)
New material from logging into Snowball and watching the Mark Rocket interview. Several items not in the offer documents.
From the Snowball public Q+A
From the webinar — Mark Rocket interview
RL's verdict
The friction has narrowed. Kea has now answered runway, Series A target, Mk2 cost ambition, and customer-pipeline status, and Snowball has provided the SHA. The biggest remaining gaps are the exact current cash balance, data-rights position, Snowball nominee passthrough/accede-as-Investor confirmation, and lack of signed Mk2 LOIs. The NZ$10k minimum remains a reasonable speculative allocation if you're comfortable with 2029+ illiquidity.
Thesis grade — updated
How Snowball Effect works — and what it costs you
- Zero direct investor fees. Confirmed: "Investing in companies through Snowball Effect is free of charge."
- The only implicit charge: Snowball keeps interest earned on your funds held in the trust account during the offer period. For a ~4-week offer at current rates on NZ$10k, this is roughly NZ$15–20.
- No ongoing management fee, admin fee, or annual charge while holding shares.
- No carried interest or percentage of gains on exit.
- Snowball charges the company up to 7.5% of total funds raised on successful close.
- At the NZ$17.5m target: Snowball earns up to NZ$1.3125m from Kea.
- This means Kea nets roughly NZ$16.2m of the NZ$17.5m raised — not a concern for return math as it comes from Kea's budget, not your allocation.
- Worth noting: Snowball takes only the NZ$2m allocation from this raise. The remaining NZ$15.5m is raised through other channels.
- No active market for shares. You cannot sell on an exchange.
- Returns via: acquisition, NZX listing, dividends, or private share sale (you find buyer).
- Snowball assists share transfers if you find a buyer; they advise on restrictions (pre-emptive rights may apply).
- Likely 2030+ before any liquidity. IPO "not before 2029" per offer docs.
- Snowball confirmed an override link can be provided after the official close, reducing deadline pressure.
- Tag-along rights: if 50%+ of shares are sold, you can tag in on the same terms.
- SHA review confirms transfer restrictions are real: any private sale must first go through existing-shareholder pre-emption before any approved third-party buyer.
What Snowball actually provides
- Deal flow: curated access to wholesale-only NZ startup raises
- Nominee structure: Snowball Nominees Limited holds legal title on your behalf, simplifying governance for Kea
- Investor portal: you get a dashboard showing your holdings, quarterly communications from Kea, and any corporate actions
- Q+A: moderated questions to Kea management during the offer period (login required to view/ask)
- Compliance: handles wholesale investor certification, anti-money laundering checks, and trust account
- Due diligence: Snowball does their own review of offer documents but explicitly state this is not financial advice and you must DYOR
Shareholders' Agreement — investor terms review
| Term | What the SHA says | Practical read |
|---|---|---|
| Liquidation preference | Preference holders have priority under Constitution clause 15: greater of 1× original amount or as-converted share, before Ordinary holders receive the remainder. | Good downside protection if Snowball's Preference Share rights pass through cleanly. |
| Anti-dilution | SHA clause 8.1: narrow-based weighted-average anti-dilution on down-rounds. Not full ratchet. | Investor-friendly but not abusive. De-risks the terms concern. |
| Pre-emptive rights | SHA 7.2 / Constitution 8.2: new securities must generally be offered pro-rata to existing shareholders unless validly approved/waived. | Useful ability to maintain ownership in future rounds, subject to Snowball process. |
| Transfer restrictions | Constitution clause 6: private sale must first be offered to existing shareholders; only then can approved third-party sale happen on no-better terms. | Assume illiquid. Snowball may assist, but there is no normal market. |
| Tag-along | Constitution clause 9: if 50%+ of shares are sold, remaining shareholders get a pro-rata same-terms offer. | Important minority protection in a major sale. |
| Drag-along | No obvious drag-along located in the reviewed SHA/constitution text. | You are less likely to be forced out, but clean exits can be messier. |
| Control / veto | Investor Director and Special Resolution mechanics give lead preference investors meaningful veto rights while thresholds are met. | Normal-ish for lead investors; small Snowball holders should not expect control. |
| Open confirmation | Schedule 4 can designate a new holder as Investor or Other Shareholder, holding Ordinary or Preference Shares. | Ask Snowball to confirm Snowball Nominees holds Preference Shares and accedes as Investor, with rights passed through to beneficial holders. |
Company fundamentals — confirmed from public records
| Field | Confirmed data | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Legal name | KEA AEROSPACE LIMITED | NZBN 9429046579171 |
| Company number | 6686235 | Tracxn / NZCO |
| Status | Active Private Limited Company | NZBN |
| Incorporated | 1 Feb 2018 | NZBN |
| Address | 11 Iversen Terrace, Waltham, Christchurch 8011 | Tracxn |
| Employees | 12 (as of Jul 2024) | Tracxn |
| HAPS Alliance | Founding member; only Southern Hemisphere member | HAPS Alliance spotlight |
| Aircraft claim | Largest unmanned aircraft built in Southern Hemisphere | ChristchurchNZ official |
Ordinary share register (Sep 2024)
| Holder | % held | Shares |
|---|---|---|
| ROCKET FLIGHT LIMITED Mark Rocket's holding company | 39.42% | 9,987,714 |
| Other ordinary holders | ~60.6% | ~15.3m est. |
What NZ$10,000 buys — and what it needs to return
| Step | Calculation | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Shares acquired | NZ$10,000 ÷ NZ$0.1485 | 67,340 Preference Shares |
| Initial ownership (post-money) | NZ$10,000 ÷ NZ$87.5m | 0.01143% |
| Future dilution (Series A + ESOP) | Hardware deep-tech: expect 35–55% dilution to exit | ~0.005–0.007% effective |
| Break-even (1×) | NZ$10k ÷ 0.006% mid-stake | NZ$167m exit |
| 2× | NZ$20k return | NZ$333m exit |
| 5× | NZ$50k return | NZ$833m exit |
| 10× | NZ$100k return | NZ$1.67b exit |
| 20× | NZ$200k return | NZ$3.33b exit |
Runway / burn
2027: ~NZ$6.5m
2028: ~NZ$7m
2029: ~NZ$11m
Raise intended to cover requirements through Series A in 2029
NZ Defence Capability Plan 2025 — the actual numbers
Sourced directly from the Ministry of Defence PDF (published Apr 7, 2025). These are confirmed government allocations, not estimates.
🎯 Combined addressable budget for Kea: NZ$200–600m (2025–2028)
Two separate DCP line items directly describe what Kea builds. This is committed government indicative spend, not aspirational.
MBIE licence activity — documented govt operational engagement (2025)
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Jul 2, 2025Variation to High-Altitude Licence — BRIEFING-REQ-0016475. Ministerial-level approval for Kea licence variation.
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Oct 22, 2025Variation to High-Altitude Licence — BRIEFING-REQ-0022764. Second variation in 4 months.
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Dec 18, 2025Variation to High-Altitude Licence — BRIEFING-REQ-0025075. Three HAL variations in six months. Active flight envelope expansion at ministerial level.
8 diligence questions — final answers
| Question | Best available answer | Status | Action before investing |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Cash balance and monthly burn? | Kea answered the burn side, not the cash-balance side. Forecast total cash outflows: ~NZ$6.5m in 2027, ~NZ$7m in 2028, ~NZ$11m in 2029. The NZ$17.5m raise is intended to cover cash requirements through to Series A in 2029. | Partial | Current cash balance still not disclosed. The runway plan is credible, but exact cash-on-hand and contingency remain the missing pieces. |
| 2. Does $17.5m fully fund Mk2 to multi-week flight? | Mostly yes for the pre-Series-A milestone path. Kea's stated milestones: build Mk2 in 2026, Mk2 stratospheric flight in 2027, perpetual flight in 2028, and start manufacturing significant aircraft volumes from 2029 after Series A. | Answered | Still ask/monitor whether any DCP Technology Accelerator funding sits alongside this plan. Manufacturing scale remains Series-A dependent. |
| 3. What signed contracts exist? | Q+A confirmed: First signed commercial contract on Mk1 — US customer, stratospheric sampling payload. Actual paid revenue. NASA + DLR recurring with more scheduled. NZDF/ADF named directly as "particularly interested." | Upgraded | Request contract table: customer, type (grant/commercial/research), annual value, term, cancellation. Has any NZDF LOI been signed post-offer-publish date? |
| 4. Series A size and dilution? | Kea answered: working idea is ~NZ$50m in 2028/29, subject to milestones/funding environment. Purpose is to set up manufacturing and expedite commercialisation. No Series A valuation guidance. | Partial | Good enough for NZ$10k sizing. For larger size, need likely Series A valuation/ownership dilution range. |
| 5. Aircraft unit cost and gross margin? | Kea answered partially: Zephyr estimated >US$15m. Kea hopes to manufacture Mk2 at <10% of that cost, implying a target below roughly US$1.5m. They expect attractive gross margins, but final model mix — outright sale, lease, or data sales — remains undecided. | Partial | This is materially positive. Still no BoM/COGS detail or utilisation-margin sensitivity, but the cost thesis is now concrete enough for the NZ$10k decision. |
| 6. What does NZ$9m/aircraft assume? | Disclosed: NZ$6,000/hr × 1,500 hrs/yr = NZ$9m. 1,500 hours = ~17% calendar utilisation = ~62.5 flight days/year. The DCP language ("persistent surveillance… months at a time") is consistent with multi-month endurance contracts. Government customers would likely contract on availability/day rates, not hourly. | Partial | Ask: are any hours contracted at those rates? What does the NZ government procurement model look like — day-rate or hourly? What is minimum contracted utilisation? |
| 7. Who owns payload/data rights? | Not disclosed. Phase 2 (from 2027) is aircraft/payload leasing to defence — government clients almost certainly own their ISR data under standard MoD procurement. Phase 3 (2035+) Kea builds own data layer. HAPS Alliance membership gives access to interoperability standards that could help Kea own non-classified data streams. | Gap | Ask: standard data rights position in Phase 2 contracts. Does Kea retain any right to anonymised or aggregated environmental data? This determines whether Kea is a services company or a data platform. |
| 8. Exact anti-dilution formula? | Answered by SHA: narrow-based weighted-average anti-dilution under SHA clause 8.1, not full ratchet. Preference shares also have a liquidation preference under Constitution clause 15. | Answered | Confirm Snowball Nominees accedes as an Investor for SHA purposes so clause 8 anti-dilution and investor-level rights apply/pass through to Snowball beneficial holders. |
Four-model debate
Original multi-model debate retained, with RL's synthesis updated for Kea's latest Q+A answers. The new answers reduce runway/unit-cost uncertainty but do not remove Mk2 technical or customer-conversion risk.
1. The moat is regulatory, not technical — and that's better
The bear case fixates on "no technical moat." That's the wrong frame for defence/dual-use hardware. What compounds in this sector: (a) regulatory infrastructure built with the regulator over years, (b) sovereign procurement relationships where governments can't buy from foreign players on equal terms, (c) industry standards participation. Kea has all three. MBIE Airspace Integration Trials + Tāwhaki + three HAL licence variations in H2 2025 = Kea has been co-building NZ CAA's autonomous stratospheric framework for 5 years. That's exactly the moat structure SpaceX built with FAA via Falcon 1/9 iterations. It's worth more than wing patents.
2. Fleet economics at 10 aircraft
NZ$9m/aircraft/year at 10 aircraft = NZ$90m annual revenue. At a 40% gross margin (conservative for an established fleet with amortised development cost), that's NZ$36m gross profit. A 10× revenue multiple (conservative for a defence-SaaS-adjacent platform with recurring government contracts) implies NZ$900m enterprise value. That's a 10× return on NZ$87.5m post-money — without any data-layer upside, any expansion beyond NZ/Aus, or any telecom/climate market entry. The maths works if the fleet gets built. 10 aircraft isn't 100 or 1,000 — it's a defensible 5-year target.
3. NZ Defence Capability Plan is not "discussions"
The DCP allocates NZ$100–300m for Long-range RPAS and another NZ$100–300m for a Technology Accelerator explicitly designed to "transition technology from prototype phase to service-ready capabilities." Kea is at exactly that stage, doing exactly that technology, in exactly the geography the DCP targets. This isn't a lobbying story — this is government budget committed to a gap that Kea fills. The question isn't whether NZ will spend this money; it's whether Kea wins it.
4. Precedent exit multiples in HAPS/UAS sector
BAE acquired 51% of Prismatic (PHASA-35) for £3m in 2019. Skydweller has raised ~US$108m. Titan Aerospace was acquired by Google for an undisclosed sum (reported ~US$60m). QinetiQ developed Zephyr and it transferred to Airbus as AALTO. The sector has an active M&A history. A single acquirer from Airbus, Boeing, BAE, Leonardo, Lockheed, or a sovereign wealth fund can drive a 10–20× return outcome if Mk2 proves multi-week endurance.
5. Where the Opus bear case is materially wrong
- Runway: 12 employees = ~NZ$3–4.5m/year burn. NZ$17.5m = 4–6 years. Opus's concern about short runway was not calibrated to actual team size.
- HAPS graveyard: Every cited failure (Loon, Aquila, SolarEagle, Helios) was targeting global telecom coverage at scale — a fundamentally different product from persistent regional maritime ISR at one location for one government customer. The use cases aren't comparable.
- VC validation: NZ$12m seed from identified investors is not "unvalidated" — Wolfgang Leitner (€6B industrial group CEO/shareholder) is a named director and funder. That's institutional validation, just not a US Sand Hill firm.
1. HAPS endurance is a brutally hard engineering problem
Every HAPS that has failed did so because the energy balance between solar harvest, battery storage, payload power, and propulsion couldn't sustain night flight at altitude. Mk1b proved stratospheric altitude. It has NOT yet proven multi-week endurance. Mk2 is a full-scale redesign targeting 30m wingspan — 2.4× larger than Mk1b. The engineering gap between day-night endurance demonstration and weeks-long persistent flight is not incremental. It's why no one has done it commercially yet.
2. Government budget ≠ Kea revenue
DCP $100–300m LRPA allocation will not automatically flow to Kea. NZ has historically procured defence equipment from established international suppliers (US, UK, Australia). The RNZAF operates P-8 Poseidons. Kea will be competing against or alongside established international RPAS suppliers. Winning sovereign procurement without prior operational service record is genuinely difficult regardless of HAPS Alliance membership.
3. The five undisclosed items remain blockers
The original five undisclosed items have narrowed: cash outflows, Series A target, unit-cost ambition and anti-dilution formula are now at least partly answered. The remaining hard gaps are current cash balance, data rights, Snowball nominee passthrough mechanics, and no signed Mk2 LOIs. These still matter, but the SHA no longer looks like a hidden red flag.
4. The NZHerald headline is a flag worth investigating
The Sep 2024 article headline references the "contract that saw him leave Rocket Lab" alongside the $15m raise announcement. The raise has since grown to $17.5m and taken 9+ months to structure. The history of Mark Rocket's departure from Rocket Lab is not fully public. If there are outstanding disputes or contractual restrictions from that relationship, they could affect Kea's access to certain technologies or markets. Worth asking directly.
5. Snowball's $2m allocation is small
Snowball's NZ$2m is 11.4% of the total NZ$17.5m raise. The company is doing most of the raise outside Snowball — meaning the broader investor group is likely institutional or strategic investors who either have information Patrick doesn't, or are placing smaller/strategic bets. Who are the other investors and what do they know?
- Planet Labs validates the market, not the competition. Planet does global daily sweeps at ~400km altitude. Kea does persistent regional stare at 20km. These serve fundamentally different requirements. Planet's US$18b market cap proves government EO spend is large and recurring — it doesn't threaten Kea.
- NZ sovereign EEZ is a government backstop. New Zealand has a legal obligation to monitor the world's 4th-largest EEZ — 4.08m km². No satellite does it persistently. No manned aircraft does it cost-effectively. Kea is the only credible sovereign candidate. The government may need them to succeed, not just want them to.
- Kea's cost moat vs Airbus/BAE is structural. Aalto/Zephyr is Airbus-priced. BAE PHASA-35 is a UK defence programme not available on favourable terms to NZ. Kea's NZ salary base = lower per-flight-hour cost. This isn't narrative — it's arithmetic.
- HAPS Alliance founding membership is non-trivial. Alongside SoftBank/HAPSMobile, Airbus/AALTO, Nokia, AeroVironment. That's participation in global spectrum coordination, regulatory standard-setting, and customer introduction flows. Pre-revenue vapourware doesn't get in.
- Five "gaps" are answerable, not fatal. Every one can be addressed by submitting Q+A questions and requesting the SHA. The question is whether Kea answers them satisfactorily, not whether they can be asked.
- Exit path diversity is broader than any single acquirer scenario. Airbus (buying competition before it grows), RKLB (natural adjacency in NZ aerospace), US/AU defence primes wanting Pacific HAPS capability, NZX listing, sovereign wealth funds, climate/ESG mandates.
Where the models converge
- The technology is real. Stratospheric flight, imagery at 42,000 ft, DLR payload integration — these are verified milestones, not claims.
- The market is real. NZ DCP confirms NZ$200–600m of combined addressable government budget for exactly what Kea makes.
- The founder is aligned. 39.4% ordinary share ownership is exceptional alignment at this stage.
- Snowball takes no carry. Your return on exit is clean.
Where they diverge — and the IC call
| Issue | Bear | Bull / Sonnet | IC verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| HAPS endurance | Brutally hard; failures dominate the category | Prior failures targeted global telecom at scale; maritime ISR at one location is a different problem | Bull wins on framing. Still the key technical risk. |
| Government contracts | DCP budget ≠ Kea revenue | Tech Accelerator + LRPA + MBIE operational licensing = structural demand pull | Both right. Budget is confirmed; Kea winning it is not. Higher probability than the bear implies. |
| Burn rate / runway | Current cash still undisclosed | Kea disclosed outflow plan: ~NZ$6.5m 2027, ~NZ$7m 2028, ~NZ$11m 2029; round intended to bridge to 2029 Series A | Bull case strengthened. Exact cash balance still missing. |
| Valuation | NZ$70m pre is demanding for pre-commercial deep tech | Below global HAPS peers at equivalent TRL; defence-accessible market | Fair-to-cheap if government contracts materialise. Rich if they don't. |
| Overall | Wait for Mk2 proof and signed Mk2 customers | Strong enough for allocation now; cost/runway milestones are clearer after Q+A | NZ$10k remains reasonable/speculative now that SHA terms look broadly acceptable. $50k+ still needs stronger customer/procurement confirmation and clearer nominee passthrough. |
Kea vs Planet Labs (PL) — FY2026 live data
| Metric | Kea Aerospace | Planet Labs (PL) — FY2026 | Implication |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | ~NZ$4.25m grants+commercial. Target NZ$9m/aircraft post-Mk2. | US$307.7m FY2026 (+26% YoY). Q4 US$86.8m (+41%). 98% recurring ACV. | Planet proves recurring govt EO revenue is real and scales. |
| Market cap / valuation | NZ$87.5m post-money (~US$52m). Private. | ~US$18.3b market cap. ~58× trailing sales. | PL is ~350× larger, but 10 years ahead. Kea is early-entry pricing. |
| Backlog | Not disclosed. | >US$900m (+79% YoY). RPO US$852m (+106%). 98% ACV recurring. | Government will commit multi-year EO contracts. PL's backlog proves it. |
| Gross margin | Undisclosed. Claims 10× advantage vs manned ISR. | ~59% non-GAAP gross margin FY2026. Compressing toward ~50% as Pelican capex scales. | ~60% margins achievable in EO at scale. Kea's model is unverified but plausible. |
| Cash | Current cash undisclosed. Kea forecasts cash outflows of ~NZ$6.5m in 2027, ~NZ$7m in 2028, ~NZ$11m in 2029; raise intended to bridge to 2029 Series A. | US$640m cash+ST investments. FCF US$52.9m (first positive year). | PL needed >US$300m to reach FCF+. Kea is targeting more capital-efficient HAPS model, but current cash remains an open disclosure point. |
| Defence customers | NZDF/RNZAF in discussions. DCP $100–300m LRPA budget confirmed. | Germany €240m, Sweden low 9-figures, NATO ongoing, DIU, SHIELD IDIQ prime, US INDOPACOM. | Planet proves govts sign large multi-year contracts. Kea needs to convert discussions to contracts. |
| Technology | HAPS: persistent regional stare, ~20km altitude, weeks of loiter. | LEO: global daily archive, ~400km altitude, SkySat/Pelican high-res tasking. | Complementary. Planet can't do persistent loiter. Kea can't do global daily coverage. |
Kea vs the HAPS competitive field
| Company | Status | Key facts | Kea's position |
|---|---|---|---|
| AALTO/Zephyr (Airbus) | Airbus subsidiary. US$100m Japan consortium (Jun 2024). EIS 2026 target. | 67 continuous days in 2025 (confirmed in Kea's Q+A). 18cm resolution Strat-Observer. Expensive Airbus cost structure. | Most serious competitor. Kea's response: cost over endurance. "Fleet of Teslas vs one Ferrari" — confirmed in writing in Q+A. |
| BAE PHASA-35 | BAE acquired 51% Prismatic for £3m 2019. Stratospheric tests 2023, 2024 (>66,000 ft). | UK defence programme. 35m wingspan. ISR focus. | UK-locked. Not competing for NZ procurement. |
| Skydweller (Leonardo) | ~US$50.7m raised. Solar Impulse IP. US/Spain. | NATO/US defence. Persistent autonomous ISR. Larger airframe. | Not competing in Pacific sovereign market. |
| Graveyard | Google/Titan, Facebook Aquila, AeroVironment Helios, Boeing SolarEagle. | All had more capital than Kea. All targeted global telecom/coverage at scale. | Different use case. Persistent maritime ISR at one location is a different problem from global connectivity. |
Mk2 fails to achieve multi-week endurance. Government contracts don't convert. Punitive or failed Series A.
- Battery/solar margin insufficient for nights at altitude
- DCP LRPA goes to international off-shelf solution
- Series A raise fails; wind-down or IP sale
- Preference liquidation preference returns some capital
NZ$10k → NZ$0–$3k
Mk2 demonstrates multi-day missions. NZ/Aus pilot contracts. Dilutive Series A. Modest fleet.
- Mk2 achieves multi-day flight by FY2028
- 1–3 pilot defence contracts (NZ/Aus) at NZ$1–10m/year
- Series A at NZ$200–500m pre, 25–35% dilution
- Trade sale or IPO NZ$250m–NZ$800m; 2031–2035
NZ$10k → NZ$14k–$57k
Multi-week endurance proven. DCP fleet contract won. Pacific expansion. Strategic exit.
- Mk2 sustains 4+ week stratospheric flight by FY2028
- DCP LRPA award to Kea: NZ$50–200m contract
- Aus Defence replicates; 10+ aircraft fleet
- Tech Accelerator grant supplements Mk2 development
- Acquired by Airbus, RKLB, BAE, or US prime at NZ$1.5b–$5b+
NZ$10k → NZ$85k–$285k+
Expected value: 28% × NZ$1.5k + 48% × NZ$35k + 24% × NZ$185k = ~NZ$62k EV on NZ$10k (~6.2×). This is bimodal, not normal. Treat the EV as directional only — you either lose most of it or make meaningful money. The middle base case is actually the hardest outcome to size.
Final thesis grading
| Category | Grade | Reasoning |
|---|---|---|
| Technical credibility | B | Real stratospheric flights. DLR imagery at 42,775 ft. NASA collaboration. Mk2 endurance = single biggest unproven risk. |
| Market need / TAM | B+ | DCP confirms NZ$200–600m of government budget targeting exactly what Kea makes. Planet Labs' US$900m backlog proves EO spend is large and sticky. |
| Competitive position | B | NZ sovereign regulatory moat (5 years building, 3× MBIE HAL briefings in H2 2025), HAPS Alliance founding membership, cost base vs Airbus/BAE, Mark Rocket's network. Real defensibility. |
| Business model evidence | B− | NZ$9m/aircraft arithmetic is disclosed and defensible. Kea now says Mk2 manufacturing cost target is <10% of Zephyr's >US$15m cost, implying attractive margin potential. No signed Mk2 LOIs yet. |
| Valuation | C+ | NZ$70m pre for pre-Mk2 hardware is demanding in isolation. But Opus bull case shows fleet economics justify it if milestones hit. Fair-to-cheap given DCP positioning. |
| Founder / team alignment | B+ | 39.4% founder ordinary ownership is exceptional. Board confirmed stable for 4+ years. DLR-trained CTO. Lean 12-person team with grant support = capital efficient. |
| Investor protection terms | B | SHA reviewed: preference liquidation waterfall, narrow-based weighted-average anti-dilution, pre-emption/pro-rata rights, tag-along, and transfer restrictions confirmed. Need Snowball nominee/accede-as-Investor passthrough confirmation. |
| Disclosure quality | B− | Kea answered several key follow-ups and Snowball supplied the SHA. Current cash, data rights, nominee passthrough/accede-as-Investor status, and Mk2 LOIs remain open. |
| Snowball platform | B+ | Zero investor fees. Zero carry on returns. Nominee structure clean. Exit mechanics clear (find buyer; no active market). Upside returns pass through in full. |
| Overall | B / B− | Upgraded to ~70/100 after Kea's Q+A response and SHA review. Structural position is stronger than the offer page implies. Remaining gaps are mostly current cash, data rights, Snowball nominee passthrough, and customer proof rather than basic viability. |
Upgrade path — what's confirmed vs still pending
- ✅ First commercial contract confirmed (Q+A)
- ✅ International investors in round (webinar)
- ✅ Boeing battery expert hired (webinar) — biggest technical risk addressed
- ✅ Zephyr 67 days in 2025 (Q+A) — Mk2 multi-week target proven physically possible
- ✅ Ferrari/Tesla confirmed in writing (Q+A)
- ✅ Forecast cash outflows disclosed: ~NZ$6.5m 2027, ~NZ$7m 2028, ~NZ$11m 2029
- ✅ Series A target disclosed: ~NZ$50m in 2028/29
- ✅ Pre-emptive rights confirmed under constitution
- ✅ Mk2 cost ambition disclosed: <10% of Zephyr's >US$15m estimated aircraft cost
- ✅ SHA reviewed: preference liquidation waterfall, narrow-based weighted-average anti-dilution, tag-along, pre-emption and transfer restrictions confirmed
- ⏳ Snowball confirms nominee accedes as Investor / rights pass through → firmer B
- ⏳ Current cash balance / management accounts confirm exact runway
- ⏳ Mk2 first stratospheric test (FY2027) → immediate upgrade on announcement
- ⏳ DCP grant confirmed → B+
RL's overall read
The picture after Q+A, webinar, and Kea's follow-up response is more complete and more positive than the offer docs alone suggested. First commercial revenue confirmed. Boeing battery hire addresses the main engineering risk. International institutional money is already in. Forecast outflows and Series A target now broadly explain the runway plan. Mark Rocket is measured, self-aware about risk, and not overselling.
At NZ$10k: the remaining unknowns are proportionate to the bet. You're making a directional call on three things — Mk2 endurance, government contracts converting, and cost advantage being real. Kea's sub-US$1.5m Mk2 cost ambition makes the cost-advantage thesis more concrete, while the customer answer confirms revenue conversion is still ahead, not already locked.
SHA terms now look broadly acceptable. If Snowball confirms nominee/accede-as-Investor passthrough and data-rights answers are sensible, conviction firms further. If Mk2 LOIs or DCP funding appear, conviction moves toward B+. If current-cash/data/customer answers stay opaque, keep size disciplined.